Railroad workers operating under restricted speed cannot assume that Positive Train Control (PTC) will protect them from every obstruction, standing train, or improperly lined switch ahead. After seven recent collisions, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) is warning railroads that crews may be relying too heavily on PTC Restricted Mode and that railroads need stronger training, testing, and supervision around restricted-speed operations.

The FRA issued Safety Advisory 2026-01: Restricted Speed on September 3, 2026. The advisory follows seven collisions between February 2024 and May 2026 that FRA says, based on preliminary investigations, appear to involve failures to comply with restricted-speed operating rules or related signal indications.

For conductors, engineers, and other railroad workers, the warning matters because FRA is not treating these events as simply a question of exceeding a numerical speed limit. The agency is focusing on whether trains can actually stop within the required distance under the conditions crews are facing.

Restricted Speed Is Not Simply a 20 MPH Speed Limit

Under FRA’s definition, restricted speed requires a train or other equipment to move at a speed that allows it to stop within one-half of the operator’s range of vision, and generally not to exceed 20 mph unless railroad operating rules impose a lower limit.

That means 20 mph is not automatically safe.

The appropriate speed can be substantially lower depending on visibility, curvature, grade, weather, train length, tonnage, braking characteristics, and other conditions affecting stopping distance. FRA emphasized that the ability to stop within one-half the range of vision controls, even when a timetable, railroad rule, or train-control system permits a higher speed.

For example, FRA explained that if conditions allow a crew to see only 20 car lengths of clear track, the train must be able to stop within 10 car lengths. Darkness, curves, weather, or other visibility restrictions can therefore require a significant reduction in speed.

FRA Says Crews May Be Relying Too Heavily on PTC Restricted Mode

PTC is designed to prevent certain types of train-to-train collisions, overspeed derailments, work-zone incursions, and movements through improperly positioned main-line switches. But PTC does not eliminate the need for crews to comply with restricted-speed rules.

FRA’s concern is particularly focused on PTC Restricted Mode.

In many PTC configurations, Restricted Mode can enforce an upper speed limit. It does not, however, determine whether the train can actually stop within one-half the crew’s current range of vision. FRA specifically warned that PTC in Restricted Mode does not detect standing equipment or misaligned switches and does not provide a visual safeguard for the crew.

This distinction is critical. A train can remain below a PTC-enforced speed and still be moving too fast to comply with restricted-speed requirements under the actual conditions ahead.

Seven Recent Collisions Prompted FRA’s Warning

The seven events cited by FRA occurred between February 22, 2024, and May 18, 2026, at reported collision speeds ranging from 12 to 30 mph.

The consequences included freight-car derailments, collisions with standing equipment, a three-train collision, multiple locomotive derailments, and a December 2025 derailment involving passenger equipment that resulted in passenger and crew injuries. FRA cautioned that its findings concerning the seven events remain preliminary.

FRA also said its preliminary investigations indicate that restricted-speed collisions frequently involve multiple contributing factors rather than one isolated mistake. The agency identified excessive reliance on PTC, failure to reduce speed due to limited visibility or train-handling characteristics, engineer or conductor distraction, and inadequate reliance on representative operational testing as issues in its investigations.

That point matters. Railroad safety investigations should not end with the question of whether an individual crew member could have reacted differently. They also need to examine the railroad’s training, supervision, operational testing, rules, technology, and operating practices.

FRA Is Calling for Changes in Training, Testing, and Supervision

Safety Advisory 2026-01 makes several recommendations directly to railroads. FRA wants carriers to review the seven collisions with operating employees, reevaluate restricted-speed training, reinforce that PTC is only an overlay, increase operational testing, and improve crew communication and situational awareness.

The agency specifically recommends scenario-based training addressing visibility, locomotive orientation, train length and tonnage, grade, curvature, braking, and environmental conditions. FRA also recommends more representative operational testing on main tracks, sidings, yards, and terminal tracks, including tests involving trains following other trains into occupied blocks or sidings. Where practicable, FRA says railroads should review locomotive event-recorder and onboard-video data when evaluating compliance.

FRA further directed railroads to reinforce active communication among crew members regarding signal indications, track conditions, and the locations of other trains and equipment. When conditions ahead are uncertain, FRA recommends reducing speed or stopping until the situation is understood.

What the Advisory Means for Injured Railroad Workers

The advisory is not a new regulation. FRA expressly states that Safety Advisory 2026-01 does not alter existing federal requirements, operating rules, or legal obligations.

But when a railroad worker is injured in a collision or derailment involving restricted-speed operations, the issues identified by FRA can point investigators toward important evidence.

A potential claim under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) requires an examination of whether railroad negligence contributed to the worker’s injury. Depending on the circumstances, that investigation may include the railroad’s training, supervision, operational-testing program, applicable operating rules, PTC data, event-recorder information, onboard video, signal indications, dispatch records, crew communications, train makeup, braking performance, track geometry, visibility, and environmental conditions. Understanding how FELA works when railroad negligence contributes to an injury requires looking beyond the fact that a collision occurred and determining why the movement was allowed to develop as it did.

That evidence can disappear or become harder to obtain quickly. Locomotive data may be downloaded, equipment can return to service, video may be overwritten, and workers can be asked for statements while the railroad is already conducting its own investigation. Knowing what to do after a railroad injury can help preserve accurate information before conditions change.

For serious cases, the FELA investigation and case-development process should examine both what the crew did and what the railroad did before the collision, including whether its training, testing, supervision, and operating practices adequately addressed a known restricted-speed hazard.

Injured in a Collision, Derailment, or Restricted-Speed Movement?

If you were injured while working for a railroad in a collision, derailment, or other movement involving restricted speed or PTC, McEldrew Purtell can review what happened and help identify the evidence that may matter under FELA.

Contact McEldrew Purtell’s railroad injury team for a free and confidential consultation about your injury and potential legal options.